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Abstract
Limited equity cooperatives (LECs) are evaluated within the following frame-
work: 1) the effect of resident participation on operating costs, 2) the disutility
of time and effort that members devote to co-op activities, 3) the intangible ben-
efits of co-op living, 4) the degree of subsidization, and 5) the financial viability
of LECs. As a result of information gathered from interviews of field practition-
ers and academic experts, the authors’ personal experiences, and a review of the
literature, LECs are seen as an effective way of providing home-ownership oppor-
tunities for low-income families the United States.
1Introduction
Limited equity cooperatives (LECs) are currently being discussed as one
of the ways to offer the opportunity of home ownership to low-income families
(Davis, 1994; Hayes, 1993; Task Force, 1993; and Heskin, 1991).  According to
economic theory, LECs represent a form of publicly assisted housing which
provides many of the characteristics of home ownership.  This is because LEC
residents can both exercise a considerable degree of control over their
housing environment and experience the economic consequences of their actions
(Miceli, Sazama, and Sirmans, 1995).  Thus, if LECs' performance in the real
world is consistent with economic theory, LECs could play an active role
within the framework of a multi-faceted-publicly-subsidized housing policy.
Part of the cu rrent interest in LECs flows from the substantial
experience with LECs accumulated in the United States over the last seven
decades.  Initially LECs became known in the United States through the various
union and state and local government programs started in New York City and the
upper Midwest in the 1920s.  Then in the 1950s and the 1960s in New York
approximately 40,000 units of LECs were formed while the New York State
Mitchell Lama low interest loans were available to LECs.  From the mid 1960s
through 1973, the federal government financed about 60,000 LEC units
throughout the country by means of its Section 236 and 221 (d) 3 affordable
housing loan subsidy programs.  With the cut off of these federal programs in
1972, the development of LECs was taken up by non-profit organizations working
in collaboration with private funders and city and state governments.  These
efforts led to some 40,000 units of LEC housing, most of which have been built
since 1985.  In addition, New York City and Washington DC have converted to
LECs more than 25,000 apartment units in privately-owned buildings abandoned
to these cities for back taxes.  Recently there have also been some
2conversions of existing HUD or Resolution Trust Finance Corporation properties
to LECs.  As a result of this collective experience there are currently over
200,000 (Table 1) units of LECs in the United States as compared to 1.4
million units of public housing (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1989).
As the size and very existence of  United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development continues to be threatened, "Third Sector" housing
(sponsored by non-profits) becomes more important.  LECs could be more easily
financed by this sector if a) there were changes in the restrictions on their
funding under the low-income housing tax credit provisions of the 1986 tax
code; and b) if FannieMae and Fredie Mac had a more active policy of
purchasing private financial institutions' mortgages on LEC properties in the
secondary mortgage market (Miceli, Sazama, and Sirmans, 1994). 
Further, LECs could play a role if there is to be a future selling off
of HUD properties.   For example, five of the 18 HOPE demonstration projects
(conversion of public housing to private ownership) involved LECs (Rohe and
Stegman, 1992).
While both public housing and Section 8 rent subsidy programs have
received substantial attention in the literature (Newman and Schnare, 1992,
Bratt, 1986; Kraft and Kraft, 1979; and Solomon, 1974), there have been few
formal attempts to evaluate the economic performance of LECs in the United
States.  We hope that this report will begin to fill some of this gap in the
affordable housing literature.  Our evaluation will be based on: a) our
personal field experience 1, b) interviews of field practitioners, and  c) a
review of the existing literature on LECs.  After a brief institutional
background section, our evaluation of LECs is organized into five sections,
each of which answers questions concerning a specific point of the economic
theory of LECs.
3(Insert Table 1 Near Here)
Institutional Background
A LEC includes the following economic characteristics:
a) ownership of a share in the cooperative which entitles a member to
residency in one of the co-op's living units;  b) free and voluntary
membership, with one household having one vote; 
c) membership control, including membership participation in the basic
decisions of the co-op and in the appointment of the management;  d) a form of
"profit sharing" with members receiving the economic benefits and losses
resulting from changes in operating costs and general market conditions
affecting the co-op; e) restriction of initial membership to households with
income below some specified limit; and f) a limit on the increase in the
resale value of member-owned-equity shares in order to keep the LEC available
as affordable housing.  Characteristics "a" through "d" are typical of all
housing cooperatives.  Characteristics "e" and "f" are unique to LECs.
1.  Does Resident Participation Reduce Operating Costs and Negative Inter-
Tenant Externalities?
Resident participation in various aspects of developing and managing a
LEC could reduce their housing cooperative's operating costs and the negative
inter-tenant externalities. 2
1.1 Project Development
According to our experience and to our interviews of field
practitioners, LEC residents have virtually no direct input in project
development - that is, in the design, financing, and construction of the
4buildings.  Therefore, it seems to us that development costs for LECs are
comparable to such costs for alternative forms of publicly subsidized housing.
 One exception is organizing costs.  Recruiting, training, and providing
technical assistance for the new co-op members is a cost which is not incurred
by developers of private rental property and by public housing authorities. 
LEC advocates believe these extra training costs are worthwhile because they
are an investment in people not just in buildings.
While not frequent, sweat equity has been used effectively in some small
cooperatives.  The reduction in construction costs is probably less than the
value of the equity credit, since the resident-workers are inexperienced. 
However, on the intangible level, residents obtain a commitment to the
buildings and develop inter-personal relations which are necessary for co-op
governance to work once the buildings are occupied (Kolodny, 1986; Santana,
interview, 1993).
Organizational decisions such as the determination of the limited equity
formula and the resident selection criteria usually are specified by the
financing legislation or made by the project developers before residents move
into their co-ops.  Because residents ordinarily do not participate in these
decisions, the organizational process itself usually does not have any direct
effects on inter-tenant externalities.  However, Rohe and Stegman (1993), in
their comparison of one successful and one unsuccessful program of converting
public housing to LECs, believe that meaningful dialogue with residents on the
structure of the co-op organization by the sponsors of the successful
conversion was an important explanation for the reduction of negative inter-
tenant externalities in that conversion.
1.2 Social Management
5Effective resident participation in the social management of LECs is
crucial to the reduction of negative externalities.  Resident social
management includes such activities as: 1) selecting new residents; 2)
evicting delinquent residents; 3) setting up and enforcing behavior rules; 4)
organizing activities that enhance a sense of neighborhood. 
There is some evidence that the social m anagement of LECs is more
effective than in other forms of low income housing. 
1) Based on informal observations of the authors, residents of LECs have been
more effective in socially managing their co-ops than have residents in
middle-income co-ops with more isolated life styles.  2) Susan Saegert's
analysis of a survey of 2,448 residents of private-owner-buildings abandoned
to New York City in the Bronx found that 42 percent of residents of buildings
converted to LECs felt that drugs were not a problem in their building, while
that view was held by only 12 percent of residents of buildings converted to
for-profit rentals, and 25 percent of residents in buildings still managed by
the City (See Table 3).  3) Saddaca, et al. found that vandalism costs, and
the presence of litter problems were lower in LECs than the two other types of
publicly assisted low-income housing that they evaluated (See Table 2).
A report by Dolkart (1993), which is in accordance with the experience
of the authors, states that, in distressed neighborhoods, a co-op needs
definable and defensible space which clearly separates the boundaries of the
co-op from the rest of the neighborhood in order for effective social
management to exist.  The members can then regulate themselves and deflect
disruptive intrusions from outside the co-op.  The possible exception to this
is when there are scattered site LEC projects that are part of an integrated
program to increase neighborhood quality.  Two examples of this exception are
Oak Center Homes project in Oakland California and Hill Central Community
Cooperative in New Haven Connecticut.  For effective social management of a
6LEC the physical design should also provide appropriate community and private
space for co-op members so that a balance can be struck between the community
and personal aspects of living in a housing co-op.
Finally, carrying out member selection and eviction have to be done
fairly and legally.  Writings by I. Fisher (1991) and H. Fisher (1987), and
Wallach (1983) indicate that it is possible to achieve this balance through
careful communication among the LEC board, its committees, and the residents.
1.3  Physical and Financial Management
"Physical management" is the care of the physical facilities.  It
includes maintaining the cleanliness of common areas, maintaining the physical
structure, and making capital improvements.  "Financial management" entails
collecting resident monthly carrying charges,  filling vacancies, paying co-op
bills, and administering co-op reserve funds.  In this section we will look at
the relative operating costs of LECs, the organizational factors influencing
the quality of LEC physical and financial management, and the influence of the
project size on the quality of LEC management.
1.3.1  LECs have Lower Operating Costs
Several studies found that co-ops have lower operating costs than
alternative forms of publicly subsidized.  The first three of these studies
pay careful attention to sample selection and use appropriate control groups.
 However, none of these studies formally consider whether lower operating
costs are partially due to LEC members deciding to spend less on structural
maintenance expenditures than appropriate for the long term care of their
building. (This issue will be discussed in section 4.3.)
First,  Claudia Parliament, et. al, (1988) used the financial statements
of 18 federally financed (Section 8) housing projects across the country to
examine their operating costs.  Ten of these projects were organized as co-
7ops, eight as rentals.  All were managed by for-profit property managing
companies.  Parliament's research found statistically significant lower
operating costs ($16 per unit per month) in the co-ops, with the biggest
difference being in the category of "repair and maintenance".
Second, an evaluation of Canadian LECs done by the federal
government's Canadian Mortgages and Housing Corporation reported,
  "Average operating costs for public and non-profit   housing
are from $2,700 to $6,000 per unit, depending
  on the particular program involved, compared with
  less than $3,000 for all types of cooperative housing   programs."
(1992, p. 328). 3
 Third, Sadacca, et al., (1972) studied sixty federally subsidized
developments, of which 20 were cooperatives, 20 were owned by limited dividend
corporations, and 20 were owned by non-profit corporations.  These authors
used 10 control variables in their analysis to adjust the mean values of the
sample of the three ownership forms for differences that could be caused by
differences in physical, social, and locational factors.  They found that
operating expenses were 24 percent lower in co-ops than in limited dividend
rentals and 22 percent lower than in non-profit rentals.  Total costs of
operation were 16 percent lower in the co-ops than they were in the non-
profits, and 34 percent lower than in the limited dividend projects (See Table
2).
  (Place Table 2 near here)
Earlier studi es which found lower relative costs in LECs include those
by Peoples' Gas Company of Chicago (1968), and by Roger Willcox (1953).
1.3.2  Other Organizational Influences on Successful Management
In spite of the above findings of lowest operating costs in LECs, there
is a debate in the literature on whether or not the ownership form is the key
variable in determining the quality of management, or if other organizational
8influences are more important.  Isler, Sadacca and Dury (1974), in their
summary report of a series of Urban Institute research projects on the
management of publicly subsidized housing, concluded that  "Holding all other
characteristics constant, co-ops are the most conducive to successful
management and limited dividends the least conducive with non-profits
somewhere in between."  However,  they added, "No form of ownership assures
successful management."  Indeed, their report stated, "... the style of
housing management - the way the owner, manager, and residents benefit one
another, and share their common problems can make or break a development much
more than a particular kind of ownership." (pp. 2 and 4)
In smaller and less formal studies, Sullivan (1971), Kolodny (1973), and
Zimmer (1977) concluded a) the quality of internal leadership; b) having an
active and committed resident group; and c) quality outside professional and
technical support are more important characteristics of successful resident
management than the form of ownership.  Nevertheless, all of these studies do
point to the relative success of LECs in many aspects of resident management
(Sullivan, p. 172; Kolodny, p. 178; Zimmer, p. 61). 
Our experience has shown us that when there is resident-ownership,
positive relations both among the owner-residents and between them and the
management agent are more likely than in other ownership forms.
1.3.3  The Importance of Project Size to Successful Project Management
While we found debate among field practitioners on the maximum number of
units for effective resident management of LECs, many believe that about 300
units is optimal (Peterman and Young, 1991; and Stewart, interview, 1993). 
Even though New York City has financially viable LECs with more than a
thousand units, many people believe that with more than 300 units the co-op
residents do not know each other, and, as a result, the sense of joint
ownership and neighborhood is lost.  This loss shackles important motivational
9characteristics of LECs.  In recognition of this factor, several countries,
including Sweden and Chile, have legislation limiting the size of housing
cooperatives.  Additional research is needed on the optimum size for LECs both
from the point of view of effective interaction among co-op members and of
economies of scale in operating costs.
Besides concern with maximum size of LECs there is concern with their
minimum size.  According to our experience and information from our
interviews, medium (26 to 100 units) and small (25 or less units) LECs are
especially in need of outside assistance and supervision in order to assure
consistent management and maintenance.  For example, Andy Reicher, (interview,
1994) executive director of the Urban Homestead Assistance Board (UHAB), the
technical assistance organization for virtually all of the conversions of New
York City city owned property to LECs, spoke of the need for this outside
influence.  He felt that since the City frequently lets small and medium LECs
struggle on their own, financial and administrative problems result, some of
which could have been avoided by appropriately timed outside help.  UHAB is
attempting to organize a more formal network of inter co-op relations. 
A second example of the control and supervision of small and medium LECs
is the Mutual Housing Cooperative Federation in the Burlington, Vermont area.
 Based on the Burlington Land Trust's experience in developing and assisting
small LECs, they organized a mutual housing federation as a secondary co-op (a
co-op of co-ops).  This federation has the authority to intervene in the
affairs of its member co-ops, which provides not only assurance to financiers,
but also stability to the management of specific LECs (Colburn, interview,
1992). 
However, outside regulation of small and medium cooperatives opens up a
tension between the cooperatives need for assistance and oversight on the one
hand, and for autonomy on the other hand.  For example, Patricia Spring, the
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executive director of Co-Opportunity, a non-profit technical assistance group
to LECs in Connecticut (interview, 1993), argues that too much regulation of
small cooperatives funded by the State of Connecticut Department of Housing by
the State would convert these co-ops into de facto  subsidized rental projects.
 Secondary co-ops which are controlled by the co-ops themselves, appear to be
more sensitive to the needs of the individual primary co-ops than are
government agencies which also regulate other types of subsidized housing.
2. How Much Is the Attractiveness of LECs Reduced Because of the Disutility of
Time and Effort Devoted to Co-op Activities and Because of Free Riders?
The larger the degree of self management, the more time and effort
residents must devote to co-op activities.  The neoclassical economics
perspective assumes that residents will prefer leisure to work, and that since
residents will consider the time and effort devoted to co-op activities as
"work," there will be a disutility from this time and effort.  However, when
the formula for resident monthly carrying charges allows, residents are
compensated for part of this disutility by the lower monthly carrying charges
which result from their time and effort.
Also, since the possibility of free riding is inherent in  cooperative
activities, potential reductions in operating costs may not be sufficient to
induce the socially optimal level of resident effort.  Under these
circumstances both institutional incentives and the enforcement of community
rules are required in order to reduce subsidies to LECs below what they would
otherwise be and to induce residents to participate in self management at the
socially optimal level.
2.1  Resident Willingness to Participate In LEC Activities
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Evidence on resident willingness to participate in the work of running a
co-op comes from interviews of community organizers, our own experience, and a
survey of co-op officials. 
On the one hand, Peterman (interview, 1993; and Peterman and Young,
1991) reported the following types of negative evaluations that some community
organizers had of LECs:  1) Rather than resident management, many low-income
residents prefer either regular rental arrangements where they purchase their
housing services, or subsidized housing services.  2) Many low income people
are already struggling with the problems associated with being poor, and
therefore they do not have the energy left to work on their housing.  3)
Residents do not perceive LECs as sufficiently close to "real" home ownership
to warrant their time and effort because of restrictions on the value and
resale of equity shares.  Accordingly, Peterman considers the enthusiasm for
the resident management component of LECs to be due more to the initial
idealism of housing advocates, than to the desires of the residents.
On the other hand, community organizers of small and medium LECs in
Burlington, Vermont, in Boston and Worcester, Massachusetts, and in various
cities in Connecticut spoke not only of successful membership participation,
but also of waiting lists for people to get into these LECs (Interviews with
Colburn and Wilson in 1992 and Hexter, Spring, and Cunningham in 1993). 
Furthermore, Donna Smithey, the Director of Peoples' Housing, a non-profit
organization on the North Side of Chicago, (interview, 1993) stated that her
organization experiences more resident participation in the LECs than in the
rental units that they sponsor.
According to our experiences large LECs usually have an outside
management agent.  Consequently, efforts of most residents tend to be
restricted to social-management issues and to attending co-op meetings.  Based
on our experience within the National Association of Housing Cooperatives, we
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believe that most large LECs not only have active and competent boards, but
they also have an internal core of leadership.  However, they do not seem to
have broad membership participation in the day to day running the co-ops. 
Most of these large co-ops seem to function well with this varying degree of
resident commitment to the running of their co-op.    
Also according to our experience, cultural factors play a role in
peoples willingness to participate in co-ops.  For example, ethnic and union
ties were important in the founding of the early LECs in New York City.  For
an excellent discussion of these socio-cultural factors in the organization
and running of several Los Angles area LECs see a research report by Allan
Heshkin (1991).
As for survey evidence on residence willingness to participate in co-op
activities, Bandy (1993) conducted a mail and telephone survey of officials
from the 271 housing cooperatives in California.  He had a 49 percent response
rate.  Those surveyed responded that "few members participate" in 35 percent
of the LECs and in 38 percent of the market rate co-ops.  To help place this
percentages in perspective, Brandy reported that a 1987 survey by Barton and
Silverman of presidents of the owners' associations of 770 condominiums and
planned unit developments in California stated that 39 percent of the
presidents responded that "members really don't care" about participation in
the owners association.
While the preponderance of informal information indicates that many low
income families are willing and able to participate in co-op activities,
further research is needed on the strength of this membership participation. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that LECs are recommended as
only a part of a multifaceted publicly subsidized housing strategy because
only some of the poor have the desire and the qualifications to become members
of a co-op (Miceli, Sazama, and Sirmans, 1994).  LEC members must have
13
sufficient stability in their personal lives to be able to contribute towards
LEC activities.  Among other things, this means that members must have both a
good rent and utility payment record, and an acceptable, but not perfect,
credit record. 
2.2  Mechanisms to Counteract Low Resident Effort
LECs have institutionalized a series of mechanisms to counteract
potential problems resulting from low member time and effort devoted to co-op
activities and the problem of free riding. 
  2.2.1  A Sense of Home Ownership
Proponents of LECs argue that the success of a LEC in creating a sense
of home ownership is crucial to a high level of resident participation.  Home
ownership can be viewed as providing a "bundle of rights."  However, some of
these rights are restricted in a LEC in order to maintain property
affordablity.  Unfortunately, if too many of these rights are removed, LECs
become little more than another form of subsidized rental housing. 4
While there are no formal studies on the impact of excluding a large
number of items from the bundle of property rights in motivating LEC members
to participate in co-op activities, mixed circumstantial evidence does exist.
 For example, some Mutual Housing Associations (MHAs) which are sponsored by
the federally created Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation have been
successful even though residents' monthly housing charges are commonly a
percentage of their income and there is no resident property equity.  However,
these MHA residents do have the right to control resident selection, formulate
some of the house rules, and the maintain common areas (Bratt, 1990).  Besides
these components of the "bundle of rights" of home ownership, the success
stories among these MHAs appear to us to be more the result of: 1) the efforts
of the specific organizers; 2) the careful selection of the initial residents;
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3) the establishment of good training programs; and 4) the quality of on-going
organizational support. 
Residents of LECs using the New York City UHAB model have a larger
portion of the bundle of ownership rights than do residents in the above MHAs,
as well as support from outside organizers.  These LECs have  1) monthly
carrying charges which do not change unless there is a change in the LEC's
operating expenses; 2) members who can not be forced to move if their income
exceeds the limits for initial membership; and 3) a required initial small
equity.  These factors seem to have resulted in a high level of member
commitment to their LECs (Task Force, 1993; Leavitt and Saegert, 1990;
Cunningham, interview, 1993; and Spring, interview, 1993). 
In order to evaluate fully the importance of the economic incentives for
resident-self management of LECs, carefully designed research studies are
necessary.  Such studies remain to be done.
  2.2.2 Economic Penalties
Besides the positive incentives to resident time and effort that flow
from a sense of home ownership, LECs also contain economic penalties for
negative resident behavior that are not found in other forms of subsidized
housing.  Most publicly subsidized housing is considered to be the housing of
last resort.  Consequently, it is quite difficult to evict residents for lack
of rent payment or for disruptive behavior (Sleeper, 1990).  However, on the
basis of both interviews and our own experience we beleive that LECs are
significantly better than private rental properties in evicting residents for
anti-social behavior.  This is both because co-op residents are directly
affected by such behavior and have the power to do something about it, and
also because, unlike public housing, co-ops are not usually the housing of
last resort.  Also, it appears that LECs are almost as efficient as are
private landlords in evicting members for lack of rent payment.  Finally,
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members' initial equity share purchases serve as quasi-security deposits which
is not available in other forms of publicly subsidized housing. 
  2.2.3  Formal Controls and Informal Factors Influencing Participation
Formal controls on the actions of a LEC and its members are imposed
either by regulatory agreement with the mortgagor, long term ground leases,
contractual agreements with the development organization, a mutual housing
federation, or by the co-op's own governance policy. 5  We know of no explicit
analysis of the efficacy of these formal controls.
Informal factors affecting the participation of residents in co-op
management are 1) the spatial relationship of the buildings; 2) the income mix
of members; 3) the interplay of the personalities of members; and 4) the
special interest and inter-racial dynamics of the co-op membership. 
Anthropologists Cooper and Rodman (1992) did an intensive case study of some
of these informal factors in two mixed income LECs in Toronto, Canada.  They
found differences in the informal pressures on residents to participate in co-
op management between the two projects.  With similar objectives, Van Ryzin
(1994) studied resident participation in six large LECs for the elderly in the
Detroit area.  He found that residents' perceptions of their control over
their co-ops were affected by the extent to which their leaders were judged to
be fair and responsive in the execution of management duties.  It appears to
us that it would be difficult to institutionalize intangible pressures on
residents to participate in management duties.  The possible remedy for this
difficulty is training for boards and members to facilitate inter-resident
communication.
3.  Does Resident Collective Action Increase the Intangible Benefits of
Cooperative Living?
16
Part of a memb er's disutility of time devoted to co-op activities can be
counter-balanced by the intangible benefits which that a member receives from
the satisfaction that is derived from living with a group whom one enjoys and
trusts, and with whom one shares common experiences.  Also, living in co-ops
can develop a resident's personal skills, give her a sense of control and
satisfaction, and increase her participation in the community outside of the
co-op (Franklin, 1981; Bratt, 1990).
3.1  Performance Indicators of Intangible Benefits
The performance indicators of the intangible benefits of living in a LEC
include lower vacancy and turnover rates than found in alternative ownership
forms of subsidized housing, as well as the development of personal skills. 
Evidence on LEC occupancy turnover and vacancy rates comes from several
sources.  1) Susan Saegert analyzed a survey of 2,448 residents of 212
formerly privately owned for-profit rental buildings that were abandoned to
New York City (Task Force, 1993).  She reported that the average years of
residency (of residents not previously in shelters) was 7.2 years for
buildings converted to co-ops, but 4 years for buildings converted to for-
profit rentals.  For buildings still managed by the City the average was 5.3
years (Task Force, 1993, p. 21).  This study covered 19 percent of the City-
owned or formerly-City-owned buildings from the Bronx.  However, the
questionnaire was administered somewhat informally by volunteers from among
local community organizers.
  2) Dewey Bandy (1993) surveyed officials from 49 percent of the housing
cooperatives in California.  He found a 1990 turnover rate of six percent in
both the LECs and in the market rate housing cooperatives. 6  To help put this
figure in perspective Bandy reports that 39 percent of households in the LECs
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had an annual income of less than $20,000, while only 5 percent of the
households in the market rate cooperatives had income in that range.
3) Dennis Cunningham, the director of El Hogar in Hartford, Connecticut
(interview, 1993) stated that vacancy rates in co-ops sponsored by El Hogar
are significantly lower than neighborhood averages.  4) In their previously
discussed study, Sadacca, et al. (1972) found a turnover rate of 16 percent
for LECs, 19 percent for limited dividend housing, and 26 percent for non-
profit sponsored housing, all of which were financed under the federal 221 (d)
3 and 236 low income housing programs (see row 3 of Table 2).  5) Roger
Willcox, one of the authors of this paper, found, while he was president of
the Foundation for Cooperative Housing Services (FCHS) in the 1960s, that in
case after case of conversions of projects to co-ops in which FCHS was
involved that the turnover rate after co-op conversion dropped by over 50
percent from whatever it had been when the project was a rental.
A final intangible benefit claimed for co-op membership is skills
development.  Verification of this benefit is virtually all hearsay.  It
stands to reason, however, that if residents are taking over the management of
their co-ops and that if this type of activity is new to them, those who
participate in management, whether few or many, will develop new skills.
3.2  Survey Measures of Intangible Benefits
Surveys of residents provide another source of information on t he
intangible benefits of living in a LEC not only in terms of residents'
satisfaction with their housing, but also in terms of their general
satisfaction with their lives and their participation in their communities.
  3.2.1 Residents' Satisfaction With Their Housing
There is good evidence that residents of LECs have greater satisfaction
from the intangible benefits of their housing circumstances than do residents
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in alternative forms of subsidized housing, but this conclusion is not
unanimously found in all of the relevant studies. 
The following surveys indicate that residents of LECs have greater
satisfaction from their living circumstances than do residents in alternative
forms of subsidized housing.
1) Susan Saegert has been involved in two separate surveys of residents
in different ownership forms of formerly-privately- owned property which was
abandoned to New York City for back taxes.  The first survey was part of a
careful sociological study done in collaboration with Jacqueline Leavitt.  In
this survey Saegert and Leavitt analyze the community organizational
activities affecting six successful LECs, two struggling LECs, and fourteen
rental buildings (1990).  They concluded that low income co-ops work, "...and
they are preferred by the most vulnerable to rental housing alternatives." (p.
219).
2) Saegert's second report is her previously discussed analysis of a
survey of residents of buildings abandoned to New York City in the Bronx (Task
Force, 1993).  Residents' evaluation of their living circumstances were
compared between residents of buildings converted to LECs and residents of
buildings converted to other ownership forms.  Residents of the LECs judged
their living circumstances to be better than or equal to the evaluations by
residents in other ownership forms in the following ways: a) good or excellent
management quality, cleanliness, and building services, b) no drug problems,
3) a smaller percentage residents wanting to move, d) a stronger participation
rate in the resident group, 5) a higher percentage of residents registered to
vote.  The full results are reported in Table 3.
(Place Table 3 near here)
3) In a small survey of disabled people who live in different kinds of
housing, Liebert (interview, 1993) found that disabled people living in a LEC
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were more satisfied with their housing and with their lives than were those
she surveyed who were living in other kinds of housing. 
4) Surveys of residents in LECs or MHAs that show high resident
satisfaction with or perceived control of their housing circumstances were
done by Van Ryzin (1994), Bratt (1990), and Ellenbecker and White (1987). 
Unfortunately, these studies lacked control groups for comparison of the
degree of resident satisfaction in LECs to that in other ownership forms.
In contrast to the results of the above studies, Donald Sullivan (1971,
p. 172) concluded that LECs may not have significant social advantages over
public rental housing units after correcting for the physical quality of the
buildings and the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents.  Sullivan
used the standard urban planning criteria for residents' satisfaction with
their housing and participation in the community to compare three subsidized
housing projects.  His conclusions were based on in-depth interviews of a
sample of 50 families each from a moderate-income LEC, a moderate-income
public housing project, and a low-income public housing project.  All families
lived in very large high-rise projects located within a few blocks of each
other in East Harlem, New York City.  Even though this survey included only
150 people in three projects, Sullivan paid close attention to controlling
extraneous influences in his analysis.  In spite of Sullivan's conclusion that
social benefits to the residents are neutral to the ownership form, he did
state that LEC tenure created a greater sense of resident responsibility
toward the maintenance of common property. 
A study that shows mixed results on resident satisfaction from living in
a LEC was done by Rhoe and Stegman (1993).  They compared two public housing
projects which had converted to LECs.  They found high resident satisfaction
with one LEC and resident dissatisfaction with the second.  These authors
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admit to concerns about inadequate control groups for their comparison of
resident satisfaction.
  3.2.2 Residents' Satisfaction with Their Personal Lives and the
Level of Their Community Involvement
Co-op advocates claim that co-ops increase residents' satisfaction with
their personal lives and increase their participation in community affairs. 
Rachel Bratt, in her previously-discussed report of the survey of Baltimore
MHA residents, states that residents claimed increased personal satisfaction
and community involvement since moving into the MHA (1990, p.44). 
Rohe and Stegman (1994a, and 1994b) researched these same satisfaction
and participation questions for subsidized low-income home buyers.  While
their study is not on LEC unit "ownership," their results provide some
insights into the potential intangible benefits of that alternative form of
home ownership.  For example, Rohe and Stegman found that even though low-
income home buyers claimed to be more satisfied with their lives than did
continuing renters, there was no significant difference between the two groups
with regard to their perceived control over their lives or to their self
esteem.  Rhoe and Stegman also found that while low income home buyers are
less likely than are continuing renters to visit with neighbors, but that they
are more likely to participate in neighborhood and block associations, but not
in other types of community organizations such as school associations.
3.3  Qualitative Evidence of Intangible Benefits
The inherent difficulties of comparing cooperatives with other
institutional forms of living is indicated by the extensive research comparing
producer cooperatives to profit-making firms (Bonnin, et al., 1993).  Many of
the goals for and the criteria of success for cooperatives are different than
those for other ownership forms.  For example, producer cooperatives may seek
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to maintain employment and high wages rather than profit maximization, which
is the goal of a typical private-production firm.
When we apply these differences in the criteria of success to housing
cooperatives as compared to other housing ownership forms problems naturally
arise for our analysis.  The previous discussion has been framed largely by
the criteria of neo-classical economics.  For example, we organized evidence
around sections on the disutility of time and effort of residents
participating in co-op activities and free riders.  Neo-classical economics
assumes "homicus economicus," the notion that rational individuals maximize
personal satisfaction subject to constrained income.  Many in the cooperative
movement believe that this perception of human motivation is a selfish one. 
They believe instead that cooperative institutions will facilitate cooperative
behavior, which in itself provides resident satisfaction. 
Cooper and Rodman (1992), both anthr opologists, did intensive case
studies of group behavior in two LECs in Toronto.  They concluded, "The
economic benefits of co-op housing were attractive, but the non-monetary
rewards seemed more important to the people we interviewed" (p. 270).  These
non-monetary rewards include the need for security, control, and
socialability, in an environment that meets the special needs of single
parents and physically disabled persons.
Birchall (1988) provides an extensive discussion of the philosophical
arguments for cooperative housing.  Most important for our purposes is that
the penultimate chapter of Birchall's book contains a balanced, but
essentially positive evaluation of case studies of six LECs in England.  He
evaluates these 6 LECs according to five different "cooperative" criteria. 
These criteria include the degree of resident participation, the ability of
the cooperators to reach common goals, and the residents sense of commitment
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to each other and to the Rochdale cooperative principles (for example, one
member one vote).
Finally, because both authors of this paper are members of the National
Association of Housing Cooperatives (NAHC), we have come into contact with
hundreds of enthusiastic LEC members striving to make their co-ops work. 
3.4  Demand for LECs
While many LECs have waiting lists for members (based on information
gathered in discussions of the authors with members of the National
Association of Housing Cooperatives, and interviews of community organizers),
some others are experiencing difficulty in filling new units or in retaining
members (Rohe and Stegman, 1993 ; and Patricia Spring, interview, 1994).  In
an evaluation of the Canadian federal LEC programs, a report of the federal
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation stated that the market for cooperative
housing in Canadian cities could be expected to be strongest under conditions
of low-rental-vacancy rates and where a majority of moderate-income households
are unable to afford home ownership (1992, p. 66). 
In section 2.1 we disc ussed individual and cultural factors that effect
a resident's willingness to participate in co-op activities.  These factors
also effect a household's initial willingness to join a co-op, that is the
demand for co-op housing.  Also, substantial experience has been accumulated
in developing and marketing LECs. In a working paper Willcox (1995) discusses
the experience of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing Services in
developing and marketing over 50,000 cooperative dwelling units in 30 states
during the 1960s.  Also see reports by Davis (1993) on the Burlington, Vermont
experience, and by Leavitt and Saegert (1990)on the recent LEC experience in
New York City.
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One indication of the relative size of demand for LECs when financial
and organizational support is available is that residents of 27 percent of the
 New York City owned and formerly owned buildings in the Bronx chose to
convert, or are in the process of converting, these buildings to LECs (Task
Force, 1993, p. 9).
Indeed, it seems to us that the crucial limiting factor for LECs
currently is a supply side, not a demand side, problem.  As will be discussed
in section 4.1, there currently is a lack of funding programs for LECs as
compared the number and size of  funding programs available for other forms of
low-income housing.
4. What Is the Degree of Subsidization for Living in a LEC?
In the previous sections we examined the following influences on a
household's decision to join a LEC and to participate in its activities, 1)
the effect of resident participation on cost reductions; 2) the disutility of
time and effort devoted to co-op activities; and 3) the intangible benefits of
cooperative living. In this section we examine the influence of the degree of
subsidization for living in a LEC on a household's decision to join and
participate in a LEC.
Because LEC residents are formally own ers, they do not pay rent. 
Rather, they pay their portion of project costs through monthly carrying
charges.  LEC residents' monthly carrying charges are affected by 1) direct
subsidies;  2) the design of monthly carrying charge formulae;  3) the
comparative costs of developing and operating LECs; 4) the financial riskiness
of LECs; and 5) the equity formula provisions used to maintain the
affordability of the LECs.
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4.1 Types of Direct Subsidies and Numbers of Units
There is a series of subsidy programs  which historically have been
available for LECs in the United States.  Table 1 contains a list of these
programs and the number of units constructed under them.  Each of these
programs has its own unique way of giving subsidies to LECs.  Subsidies are
given as (1) payment for development, organizing and planning costs; (2)
capital grants; (3) below-market interest rates; and (4) direct and indirect
contributions toward capital and/or operating costs.  Virtually all of
the direct-federally-financed LECs were built in the 1960s and early 1970s.
The key subsidy in these federally financed projects typically was a 3 percent
fixed rate 40 year mortgage, with up to 100 percent federal financing.  This
below market interest rate program resulted in a reduction of approximately 25
percent of the total annual costs for these federally sponsored co-ops.  For
the other programs listed in Table 1 typical subsidies were equivalent to 10
percent to 30 percent of annual costs. 
As can be seen from Table 1, and discussed  in the introduction, the
availability of public funds has dramatic impact on the timing of activity and
the number of LECs.
Recently, especially in Minnesota and California, some lease-hold LECs
have been partially financed with funds available under the tax credit
provisions. 7  However, in our view, these lease-hold LECs are not as
attractive as full LECs, because they remove still more of the "bundle of
rights" of property ownership that economic theory maintains is important to
resident motivation.  Our preference would be to allow LECs to be funded
directly by these tax credits.
Finally, the regulatory procedures for the conversion of existing HUD
properties to other ownership forms could be modified for co-ops.  Under
current regulations existing residents need to be organized into a quasi-co-op
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before a community non-profit can make a formal offer to convert a building to
a co-op, while for-profit developers can make an immediate bid on the choice
buildings (Stewart, interview, 1993).  Additional discussion of current
sources of funding for LECs can be found in a report by the Agora Group
(1992).
4.2  Monthly Housing Charge Formula
Resident monthly costs are also affected by the design of the monthly
carrying charge formula.  The variety of formulae used to calculate monthly
housing charges falls into two distinct types, either a flat fee per unit or a
fixed percentage of household income.  Most LECs use some variation of the
flat fee formula in which the initial fees are calculated as sufficient to
cover the unsubsidized portion of costs.  Theoretically, because changes in
these fees occur only when there are changes in the operating costs of the
LECs, these flat fee formulae contain incentives for residents to reduce their
operating costs. 
When the percent of income formula is employed, residents' charges
depend on household income and not on project costs.  Therefore, there are no
economic incentives within the percent of income formula for residents to
reduce project costs (Miceli, Sazama, and Sirmans, 1995).  Nevertheless, Roger
Willcox has observed that member boards of directors of Section 8 LECs which
use the percent of income formula have shown a tendency to increase the
quality of life for residents more than is commonly found in Section 8 pure
rental projects.  The LEC boards do this by encouraging the management to work
harder in the interest of improving living conditions in such ways as giving
faster service on work order complaints, providing better maintenance
standards, and by upgrading community facilities.  Furthermore, residents of
LECs, unlike those in public housing, ordinarily are not required to leave the
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LEC if their incomes surpass the initial eligibility criteria.  This factor
provides an additional incentive for LEC residents to think of their housing
unit as their own, and, therefore, to treat it in a cost effective way.
Unfortun ately, there are no formal empirical studies that quantify the
effects of the flat fee formula as compared to other influences on operating
costs and the quality of life in LECs.
4.3  Limited Equity Formulae
Keeping a LEC affordable requires not only subsidies but
also limits on the value of resident owned equity shares in the co-op.  These
limits on equity share values include both limits on the initial share price
and limits on the rate of increase in the resale value of these equity shares
so that LECS are initially, and remain, affordable to low-income families.  A
few LECs permit no increase in share values, but most permit increases either
according to some fixed percent or some wage or cost index.  Finally, there
usually are restrictions so that a share can only be resold to another low-
income household which has been accepted by the co-op board.
As will be discussed in the following two subsections, debate over the
appropriate design of the limited equity formula raises both efficiency and
equity issues. 
4.3.1 The Share Value Formula and Efficiency Issues
A key efficiency issue is the role that capital gains in share values
plays as an economic incentive for co-op members.  According to neo-classical
theory, if a homeowner defers structural maintenance expenditures, a decrease
in the capital value of the building results.  Therefore, if increases in LEC
share values are restricted, the economic incentives to carry out appropriate
long-term maintenance expenditures are diminished.  Roger Willcox counters
this argument.  He has found that when similar LEC and low-income rental
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buildings are found in the same neighborhood, the long-term maintenance of the
LEC buildings has been superior.
Evidence supporting the argument that limits on the capital gains the
resident receive result in the co-op deferring building maintenance
expenditures comes from  a study of Canadian LECs done by the federal
government's Canadian Mortgages and Housing Corporation.  This study found
that between 43 percent and 53 percent of the LEC managers surveyed (depending
on type of finance program) reported postponement of either maintenance or
improvement activities (1992, p. 326).  These Canadian LECs have par-vale
shares - zero increase in share value.  This conclusion on capital
expenditures was part of an overall favorable evaluation of the Canadian LEC
programs. It involved an analysis of surveys of residents, board members, and
managers, as well as physical site visits for a sample of 300 cooperatives
from a universe of about 600 cooperatives.  No comparative data was presented
on the maintenance experience of other Canadian government low-income housing
programs.
4.3.2 The Share Value Formula and Equity Issues
The design of the co-op share value formula raises at least four equity
(fairness) questions.  Deciding the answers to these questions involves trade-
offs among the various goals of subsidizing LECs.
1) "What will be the effect of increases in share value on reducing the
supply of affordable housing?"  It seems likely that if the increase in share
values is allowed to reflect the full increases in the market value of the co-
op's building, low income families probably would not be able to purchase
equity shares when an existing member of a LEC decides to leave the LEC.  Thus
there is a trade-off between the efficiency effects of the capital gains which
were discussed above and the size of affordable housing stock.
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 2) "How much of the benefits of public subsidies should be realized as
capital gains by the LEC members?"  If there were weak restrictions on the
resale of LEC shares, individuals leaving a LEC would receive benefits from
the public subsidies as reflected in the resale value of their shares.  Berger
and Turner (1991) found in their study of subsidized housing cooperatives in
Sweden that windfall capital gains received by households leaving the co-ops
increased the demand for housing cooperatives in Sweden relative to the demand
for other forms of rental housing.  However, there are weak household income
limits on membership in these Swedish housing cooperatives.
A related concern about windfall capital gains from public subsidies
involves the privatization of the whole LEC so that all existing members can
realize a capital gain.  Recent battles have developed within and among some
of the mature LECs in New York City, Illinois, and Massachusetts over this
issue (Smith, interview, 1993; Rappaport, interview, 1993; and consulting
experiences of Roger Willcox).  Privatization of LECs has been eliminated by
legal prohibitions and land trusts.  According to Birchall, both France and
Italy legally prohibit LEC members from privatizing their LEC (1989, p. 193).
 A land trust involves a property deed covenant on a parcel of land that
restricts its use to affordable housing (Burlington Community Land Trust,
1988).  The non-profit that instituted the land trust then contracts a long
term renewable lease of the land (for example 99 years) with the housing co-op
which owns a building on that land.
3) Another equity questio n is, "If the capital gains due to subsidies
can be clearly separated from increases in value due to member efforts, should
members individually receive the benefits of these efforts?"  Using a
neoclassical economics approach, individual LEC members should be allowed to
receive the direct benefits of their actions.  However, it has been difficult
to design formulas which separate out these benefits from the affects of the
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subsidies and changes in general market conditions.  Also, some co-op
advocates argue that the benefits should be held by the cooperative for the
common benefit of all present and future members.
4) "Should residents be allowed to keep part of the capital gains
resulting from subsidies in order to facilitate their transition to
traditional home ownership?"  Those strongly favoring private home ownership
argue that LEC residents should keep part of the capitalized value of the
subsidies in order to facilitate this transition.  On the other hand, many
advocates of low-income housing argue that allowing residents to keep
subsidized capital gains reduces the availability of affordable housing. 
 Additional discussions of the issues involved in the design of the
equity formula can be found in work by Colburn (1990), Fisher (1993), and Rohe
and Stegman (1992, p. 153).  But, further research is needed in this area in
order to clarify the extent of the economic efficiency effects of limits on
equity value, and to consider more carefully the trade-offs of the various
equity goals.
5.  What is the Degree of Financial Risk of Living in an LEC?
While flat fee monthly carrying charges and financial autonomy create
advantages for LECs and their members, these characteristics also create
financial risk for them.  After a discussion of the types of risks involved,
we will explore the available evidence on the financial stability of LECs.
5.1  Types of Financial Risk
Financial risks to LECs and their members are caused by one or a
combination of the following:  1) inadequate initial capital expenditures,
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subsidies, monthly carrying charges, or reserve funds; 2) poor administration;
and 3) economy-wide fluctuations.
If initial capital improvements are inadequate, LECs, especially new
ones, will find themselves in financial difficulties.  Struggles between the
LEC and the sponsoring agency often result, and LEC residents not only remain
dependent on the outside agency, but also are subject to increases in monthly
carrying charges.  These factors, in turn, can cause some members to "jump
ship,"  and thereby throw the LEC into a downward financial spiral.  Some
examples of this phenomena are found in Rohe and Stegman's (1993) discussion
of the Denver Public Housing Authority's conversion of a distressed housing
project into a LEC, and Henderson's discussion of financial problems of some
of the New York City owned apartments that have been converted to LECs (Task
Force, 1993).
The financial viability of a LEC can also be threatened by economy-wide
fluctuations in three ways.  First, downturns in the real estate market result
in a decrease of private rental rates making them competitive with the monthly
carrying charges of especially the newer LECs.  Members might then leave LECs
for the private rentals, which in turn can damage the LECs' financial
viability.  Second, because LEC members have low incomes, they experience a
disproportionate share of the fluctuations in economy-wide unemployment. 
Since a household's flat fee monthly charges do not decrease when its members'
incomes decrease, unemployment can result in eviction.  All monthly charges
may then have to increase to keep the LEC financially solvent.  Third,
financial shocks can also can cause financial problems. For example, sudden
increases in energy costs and inflation in the 1970s, and variable interest
rates in the 1980s created serious financial difficulties for some LECs.
It is logical that a LEC will remain financially sound either if its
monthly carrying charges are low relative to rents in the current real estate
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market, or if it has high subsidies relative to its costs and member income. 
However, when the level of subsidies is evaluated the real question should not
be what level of subsidization is necessary to keep the co-op financially
viable, but rather, whether or not the social benefits of the subsidies exceed
their social costs.  Unfortunately, we know of no studies which address this
issue.  Also, there is a need for studies that assess the influence of the
financial risk of living in a co-op on a household's willingness to join a
LEC.  The evidence that is available on the financial stability of the housing
cooperatives themselves is examined in the following section. 
5.2  Available Evidence
The general record of financial viability for LECs is quite strong as is
indicated by the ability of most LECs to survive the Great Depression and by
various statistical studies.  However, there have been occasions when LECs
have experienced great financial difficulties. 
The Great Depression was especially severe on market-rate cooperatives
for high income families.  Most such housing cooperatives were in New York
City, and by 1934 only two of them remained (Siegler and Levy, 1986, p. 15). 
However, LECs seem to have done better than did these market-rate housing
cooperatives.  For example, all of the 13 large low and moderate-income
cooperatives constructed during the inter-war period under the State of New
York's 1927 Limited Dividend Housing Companies Law, including the 1,400 unit
co-op sponsored by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union survived the
Depression without seeking new financing and without members being forced to
leave their homes (Siegler and Levy, 1986 p.15; and the International Labor
Office, 1964, p. 116).  Apparently, that these LECs used conservative
financial policies such as low debt-equity ratios coupled with the
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availability of large accumulated reserve funds, were important to their
survival.
Calhoun and Walker (1994) studied the 1958-1989 loan pe rformance records
of all federally insured Section 221 (d) 3 and 236 housing projects.   The
average size of projects under both programs was about 100 units per LEC, and
most of them were built between 1963 and 1976 (Angora Group, 1992).  Calhoun
and Walker found the default rate for LECs under the 221 (d) 3 program to be
lower than that for the non-profit and limited-dividend projects that were
similarly funded.  They also found that under the 236 program  the 20 year
"survivor rate" for LECs was 78 percent, as compared to 77 percent for non-
profits and 90 percent for limited-dividend projects. 
Roger Willcox believes that an important explanation for the different
default rates under these two LEC funding programs was the difference of the
availability of services from a single national sponsor of cooperatives.  The
Foundation for Cooperative Housing Services (FCHS) helped organize and provide
continuing support for most of the cooperatives financed under the Section 221
(d) 3 program.  LECs have the strongest financial record under this program. 
However, by 1969, the time that Section 236 became a primary source of funds
for LECs, FCHS was reorganized in such a way that it could no longer function
as a national technical assistance organization for LECs.
Bandy (1993), as a result of his mail and telephone survey of
representatives of California housing cooperatives, stated that 6 percent of
the market-rate cooperatives surveyed indicated that finances were a major
problem for them as compared to 20 percent of the LECs.  Only one of the 44
LECs responding to the survey reported having serious financial problems.  Of
course, market rate co-ops have less restrictions on their governance, because
they are not subsidized.  Also, market-rate co-ops have more flexible sources
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of funds because they are owned by middle income families, while LECs are
owned by low and moderate income families. 
Starting in the mid 1980s there have been dramatic shifts in our
nation's real estate markets simultaneous with increases in the financial
problems of low-income households.  This has had its effect on LECs,
especially on the newer ones.  For example, while about three quarters of the
650 former New York City-owned-abandoned properties converted to LECs in the
1980s were financially stable in 1993, one quarter of these LECs were
experiencing financial difficulties (Task Force, 1993, pp. 65-73; and Reicher,
interview, 1994).  Causes of these financial difficulties included  1)
inadequate structural improvements in some of the buildings before they were
turned over to the co-ops;  2) LECs having to absorb the impact of large city-
wide increases in property taxes and water and sewer charges that occurred
during this period; and 3) a lack of internal human capital and reduced
funding for external technical assistance to these LECs.
Finally, in the late 1980s, a few co-ops organized by non-profit
organizations were financed both with high or variable interest rate mortgages
and with a high percentage of debt financing.  They co-ops consequently
experienced financial difficulties resulting from the 1990 recession
(Institute of Community Economics, 1992, p. 10). 
6.  Conclusions
Several conclusions on the effectiveness of limited equity housing
cooperatives (LECs) are supported by the evidence presented in this paper. 
First, resident participation in LECs reduces operating costs.  Second, there
are both economic incentives and penalties, as well as both internal and
external institutional factors available to LEC members to encourage them to
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provide similar time and effort to co-op activities as they would to their own
single family houses.  Third, resident collective action increases the
intangible benefits of cooperative living.  Fourth, LECs require subsidization
in order to be available to low and moderate-income households.  Fifth, the
general record of financial viability for LECs is quite strong.  Linking LECs
through regional federations and national associations which provide oversight
and technical assistance to the member co-ops increases their viability and
efficiency.  Further study is needed a) to clarify issues in LEC policy,
such as design of the formula for resident monthly housing charges, and
appropriate sources of funding; b) to evaluate further the above preliminary
conclusions, and  c) to measure the strength of the incentives for positive
resident behavior created by the institutional structure of limited equity
cooperatives.
LECs are one way, within a multifaceted policy, for satisfying the need
for publicly subsidized housing in the United States.  LECs work best when
policy objectives include both the need for better quality housing as well as
for personal developmental opportunities for member residents.  It must be
recognized that LECs are not suitable for all low and moderate-income
households.  LECs work best for those people who can accept the additional
responsibility of owning and managing their own housing in a cooperative way.
 There is evidence that as much as 20 percent of those presently eligible for
publicly subsidized housing assistance are willing to accept this
responsibility, especially when LECs are properly structured and financed.
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Table 1
Types and Number of Limited Equity Cooperative Units
 in the United States, 1991
Federal Government Sponsored:
  Direct
FHA BMIR, Section 221 (d) 3                        36,000
FHA Section 236                                    23,000
Section 202 (Senior Citizen)                        1,000
FHA Rural Self Help                                 3,000
  Indirect
Conversion of Public Housing                       12,000
Via Community Block Grants                          7,000
State and Local Government, and Non-Profit Sponsored: a
  New York
State and City Programs b                           60,000
  United Housing Foundation, Labor Unions,
   and Non-Profit Organizations                    35,000
  Other States' Programs                                 40,000
  Washington DC Abandon Building Conversion Program       7,000
Total c                                        200,000 - 225,000
Notes:
a. Many of these programs are assisted by FHA and HUD rent supplement
programs, and via federal community block grants.  For additional information
on this funding see a report by the Angora Group (1993).
b. Virtually all of these New York LECs have been built either under the
State's 1927 Limited dividend Housing
b. Several thousand of the total units, especially those financed by
direct federal programs, have had an expiration of their limits as an LEC and
have been converted to market rate co-ops or private ownership.  For a
discussion of conversions see text section 4.3.
Source of Data:  National Association of Housing Cooperatives, 1991.
Table 2
Some Measures of Management Success in
Three Types of Publicly Assisted Private Housing
(Dollar figures are costs per month per unit)
Criteria Adjusted Mean  
   Non-  Limited   Co-op
Profit Dividend
Vandalism Cost      $1.55   $2.55    $ 0
Presence of Litter Problems a   1.05    1.12    .46
Annual Turnover Rate    26%     19%    16%
Maintenance and Operating  $32.49  $33.47   $25.31
Expenses
Total Cost of Operations  $124.48  $159.94   $105.13
Including Depreciation
a.  Calculated on a scale of "0" (no problem) to "3" (serious problem).
Source of Data: Sadacca, et al., (1972) as reported in Zimmer (1977) pp. 64-
65.
Table 3
Residents' Evaluation of Their Building, by Type of Building
All Buildings Are Previously Privately Owned Apartments
Which Were Abandoned to New York City
And Converted by the City to a  New Ownership - Management Form
View or Characteristic   Limited  For-Profit   City      
     Equity   New Private  Managed
  Co-op    Owner
Good or Excellent:
  Management Quality                   41         15        29
  Cleanliness                          37         15        19
  Building Services                    56         33        38
Drugs not a Problem                    42         12        25
Want to Move                           41         60        41
Participate in Resident Group          39         24        24
Registered to Vote                     62         40         -
Income Greater than $20,000            19         34        12
Source of Data:  Task Force, 1993, pp. 17-48.
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Dear Mr. Bromley:
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limited equity housing cooperatives and using the methodological approach used
in our paper would fall within Land Economics 's current interests.  A copy of
the introduction and abstract of our paper is enclosed.
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Notes
Abstract
An Evaluation of Limited Equity Housing Cooperatives
In the United States
Limited equi ty cooperatives (LECs) are evaluated within the following
framework: 1) the effect of resident participation on operating costs,  2) the
disutility of time and effort that members devote to co-op activities, 3) the
intangible benefits of co-op living, 4) the degree of subsidization, and 5)
the financial viability of LECs.  As a result of information gathered from
interviews of field practitioners and academic experts, the authors' personal
experiences, and a review of the literature, LECs are seen as an effective way
of providing home-ownership opportunities for low-income families the United
States. 
1Introduction
Limited equity cooperatives (LECs) are currently being discussed as one
of the ways to offer the opportunity of home ownership to low-income families
(Davis, 1994; Hayes, 1993; Task Force, 1993; and Heskin, 1991).  According to
economic theory, LECs represent a form of publicly assisted housing which
provides many of the characteristics of home ownership.  This is because LEC
residents can both exercise a considerable degree of control over their
housing environment and experience the economic consequences of their actions
(Miceli, Sazama, and Sirmans, 1995).  Thus, if LECs' performance in the real
world is consistent with economic theory, LECs could play an active role in
our nation's affordable housing policy.
Part of the current interest in LECs flows from the substantial
experience with LECs accumulated in the United States over the last seven
decades.  Also, in the last decade non-profit organizations sponsored many
LECs.  With the size and very existence of United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development now being threatened, this "Third Sector" housing
(sponsored by non-profits) will become more important.  Further, LECs could
play an increased role given the likelihood of a future selling off of some of
HUD's properties.   For example, five of the 18 HOPE demonstration projects
(conversion of public housing to private ownership) involved LECs (Rohe and
Stegman, 1992).
While both public housing and Section 8 rent subsidy programs have
received substantial attention in the literature (Newman and Schnare, 1992,
Bratt, 1986; Kraft and Kraft, 1979; and Solomon, 1974), there have been few
formal attempts to evaluate the economic performance of LECs in the United
States.  We hope that this report will begin to fill some of this gap in the
affordable housing literature.  Our evaluation will be based on: a) our
2personal field experience 8, b) interviews of field practitioners, and  c) a
review of the existing literature on LECs.  After a brief institutional
background section, our evaluation of LECs is organized into five sections,
each of which answers questions concerning a specific point of the economic
theory of LECs.
  Roger Willcox has been associated with the development of more than 50,000 cooperative dwelling
its in 30 states in his capacity as president of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing Services,
e technical subsidiary of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing.  He has maintained his active
terest in housing cooperatives through his leadership in the National Association of Housing
operatives.  Mr. Sazama became involved in LECs by spending a sabbatical semester doing participant
server research as a staff member of Stop Wasting Abandoned Property, a non-profit organization
veloping a LEC in Providence, Rhode Island.
  For an evaluation of resident participation in general see work by Monti (1989), and Peterman and
ung (1991).  The latter study also evaluates resident management in alternative types of low income
using.
 Methodology of the Canadian co-op evaluation is discussed in section 4.3 of this paper.
Home ownership can be viewed as providing the following bundle of rights:  control over the
lection of tenants; control over property use; the right to privacy; long term tenancy rights;
centives to reduce operating costs which are consistent with the long term maintenance of the
operty; a fixed mortgage payment; possibilities of capital gains; autonomy in making improvements
d additions; the right of secession of the property to an immediate family member; and control over
operty design and location. 
  A sample copy of these documents for LECs sponsored by community based non-profit organizations is
ailable from Regional Housing Legal Services, Glenside, Pennsylvania 19038.  Other samples can be
tained from Roger Willcox, the National Association of Housing Cooperatives in Alexandria Virginia,
d the Center for Cooperatives, University of California at Davis.
  The Bandy survey (1993) covered 62 percent of the LECs and 44 percent of all of the housing
operatives (LECs and market rate) in the state of California.  Six of the 44 LECs surveyed were
bile home parks.
  A lease-hold LEC is an LEC which leases its property from another corporation, rather than owning
e building directly as do ordinary LECs.
  Roger Willcox has been associated with the development of more than 50,000 cooperative dwelling
its in 30 states in his capacity as president of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing Services,
e technical subsidiary of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing.  He has maintained his active
terest in housing cooperatives through his leadership in the National Association of Housing
operatives.  Mr. Sazama became involved in LECs by spending a sabbatical semester doing participant
server research as a staff member of Stop Wasting Abandoned Property, a non-profit organization
veloping a LEC in Providence, Rhode Island.
